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I.   INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 1991, attorneys at a prestigious national law firm in
the nation’s Midwest were faced with a unique proposition. Although the
firm had a long list of well-heeled, blue-chip clients who could afford the
firm’s substantial hourly rates, the firm’s newest potential client was nei-
ther a Fortune 100 corporation nor a high net worth individual. Instead,
the client was a citizen of the far-off State of Florida who was seeking to
entice these white-shoe lawyers into entering the world of contingent class
action litigation.
Having just purchased a used 1978 Cadillac Seville in Chicago for
$500, David Kuhnlein had driven it home to Florida only to find that it
would cost him nearly that much simply to obtain the necessary Florida
registration and plates to own and operate the vehicle in his home state.
Kuhnlein had purchased numerous in-state vehicles in the preceding dec-
ade, and he never encountered the $295 “Vehicle Impact Fee” the Florida
Legislature had enacted the prior year on all vehicles previously titled out
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of state.1 The so-called “Yankee tax” that he paid was intended by the
Legislature to offset the burden imposed by numerous individuals and
families moving to Florida each day.2
Outraged over the discriminatory unfairness of such a fee, Kuhnlein
contacted these lawyers to see whether they would be interested in repre-
senting him in litigation seeking a refund of the fee. Because he had only
$295 at stake, it was obvious that any suit challenging the fee would have
to proceed as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated Florida citi-
zens.
Accordingly, these attorneys were faced with a series of decisions. On
its face, the Impact Fee provision raised substantial concerns under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which prohibits
states from enacting laws that unduly burden or discriminate against in-
terstate commerce.3 Since litigation attacking the Impact Fee on such
grounds would be a class action seeking a refund of taxes from the State,
the attorneys’ only reward for successfully prosecuting the litigation
would be an award of attorneys’ fees. In addition, the attorneys would be
required to fund the entire litigation until final judgment, which, in light
of Florida’s congested trial and appellate court systems, could take up
most of the decade. Thus, if the litigation were unsuccessful for any rea-
son, be it substantive or procedural, the attorneys would be left footing
the entire bill, including all of the considerable expenses implicated by
such a complex case. In light of these risks, the attorneys would—indeed,
could—take the case only on the promise of compensation well beyond the
normal hourly rate.
At that time, both Florida and Eleventh Circuit precedent provided that
an award of attorneys’ fees in common fund litigation such as this would
be based on a percentage of the common fund recovered.4 Both jurisdic-
tions in such cases had abandoned the “lodestar” or “multiplier” method
in which attorneys are limited to a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by a
number based on factors such as the complexity of the litigation.5 With
the promise of the possibility of a percentage fee, the attorneys agreed to
take the case. They agreed to represent the class of 648,000 citizens of
Florida who had paid the Impact Fee because they believed that the risks
inherent in such highly contingent litigation were well worth taking in
light of even the remote prospect of a hefty percentage recovery.
                                                                                                         
1. The Vehicle Impact Fee, FLA. STAT. § 319.231 (repealed by 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-
140).
2. Kuhnlein v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, No. 92-6224, slip op. at 7-9 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct.
Nov. 30 1993).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991); Ten-
ney v. City of Miami Beach, 11 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1942).
5. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 768; Tenney, 11 So. 2d at 188.
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After four years of rough-and-tumble litigation, the Impact Fee attor-
neys achieved a phenomenal and unprecedented result. In a unanimous
decision, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court’s deci-
sion6 striking down the Impact Fee under the Commerce Clause and or-
dering a refund of the $188 million of Impact Fees the State of Florida
had collected since it enacted the unconstitutional tax in 1991.7
With this hard-fought victory in hand and the refund process well on
its way, the Impact Fee attorneys then filed a petition for fees and ex-
penses in which they requested a fee award of fourteen percent of the
common fund, a figure they arrived at by examining awards in compara-
ble cases.8 The Impact Fee attorneys asserted that a fourteen percent fee
was justified in light of the risks they had taken and the results they had
achieved. These risks, which would have constituted a complete bar to re-
covery, included the possibility that the court would find that (1) the fail-
ure to exhaust administrative remedies barred a suit in state court; (2)
taxpayers could not seek a refund through the class action mechanism; (3)
other remedies short of a refund were constitutionally permissible; or (4)
                                                                                                         
6. On November 30, 1993, the trial court granted summary judgment and ordered a full
refund to the Class. Florida Dep’t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995). Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the Class’s motion for prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Florida Dep’t
of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 662 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1995).
7. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 726.
8. See, e.g., Fickinger v. C.I. Planning Corp., 646 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(awarding 33.3% in case pending for five years because plaintiffs had survived summary
judgment and a number of other motions and had done a significant amount of discovery); In
re AIA Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 84-2276, 1988 WL 33883 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1988)
(awarding 33% after substantial discovery and lengthy settlement negotiations; case pending
approximately three years); Greene v. Emersons Ltd., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,263 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1987) (involving fees and costs of 46.2% in pro-
tracted case taking over ten years to resolve); Eltman v. Grandma Lee’s, Inc., [1986-87 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,798 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (awarding 33% after four
years of extensive discovery, motions, and settlement negotiations); In re Infant Formula Anti-
trust Litig., MDL No. 878, 1992 WL 503465 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 1993) (granting 25% fee
award, resulting in a fee of $31.4 million, after class counsel’s settlement of antitrust matter
for $125 million); In re Am. Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., MDL No.
834 (D. Ariz. July 24, 1990) (awarding class counsel 25% of the first $150 million of any set-
tlement, 29% for all amounts thereafter, plus additional percentages as incentives to settle the
case expeditiously); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912 (D.P.R.
1991) (awarding $35 million of $220.9 million settlement); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Sec.
Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,984 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (awarding
$17.7 million plus expenses—an amount representing 25% of $72.5 million settlement fund);
In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 159 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 1983) (awarding 15% of
$171 million of the settlement fund). The court-awarded fee is also far below the percentage
awarded in taxpayer class actions in Florida and elsewhere. See City of Miami Beach v. Ja-
cobs, 341 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (awarding fee of 37% of the common fund), cert.
denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla.), and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Tenney, 11 So. 2d at
188 (awarding fee of 33% of fund); City of Ozark v. Trawick, 604 So. 2d 360 (Ala. 1992)
(approving 33% fee award from common fund); State v. Private Truck Council of Am., Inc.,
371 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 1988) (approving 33% fee award from common fund).
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the statute was not, despite its facial discrimination, unconstitutional. In
similar cases, courts have ruled against classes seeking refunds on these
grounds and, thus, have left the attorneys with the bill for the costs and
expenses for the entire litigation and without a reasonable attorneys’ fee.9
Therefore, when the trial court awarded a reasonable attorneys’ fee of
ten percent of the common fund,10 it appeared that these numerous, real
risks had been worth taking—or so it seemed.
A few months after the trial court’s award, the Florida Supreme Court
overruled existing precedent, parted ways with the Eleventh Circuit, and
rejected the modern and majority percentage method for determining fee
awards in common fund class action litigation.11 Instead, the court held that
fee awards in such cases will be governed by the previously disfavored and
widely discarded lodestar method, which focuses not on the risks taken and
results obtained but, instead, on the hours billed by the attorneys.12 Holding
that the maximum multiplier available under Florida law was five, the Su-
preme Court awarded a reasonable attorneys’ fee of five times counsel’s
hourly rate, a figure that computed to approximately $6.5 million.13
This Article addresses the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of the per-
centage method and adoption of the lodestar method. It traces the develop-
ment of those doctrines and outlines the strengths and weaknesses of each
method. It then examines the effect the lodestar method will have on attor-
neys presented with contingent common fund litigation and concludes that
the public will be ill-served by the court’s departure from precedent.
II.   THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE
It has been well settled since at least 1881 that when attorneys generate a
common fund for the benefit of a class, their fees should be paid by the
class members.14 Florida courts have long “recognize[d] the rule which
permits the award of [attorneys’] fees [to be awarded] ‘from a fund or estate
which has been benefited by the rendering of legal services.’”15 Under the
“common fund doctrine,” attorneys who recover a common fund for the
                                                                                                         
9. See, e.g., Woosley v. State, 838 P.2d 758 (Cal. 1992) (upholding finding that similar tax
was unconstitutional but dismissing suit on finding that taxpayers could not use class action mecha-
nism to seek refund from the state), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940 (1993); Bailey v. State, 412 S.E.2d
295 (N.C. 1991) (requiring taxpayers to exhaust administrative remedies), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911
(1992); American Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (holding that where a decision
breaks new constitutional ground, a state may in certain instances deny retroactive relief); Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (noting inconsistency in Commerce Clause
holdings).
10. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 717.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Internal Imp. Fund Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1881).
15. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. O’Shea, 397 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
(quoting Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Fla. Constr. Co., 341 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1976)).
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benefit of persons other than themselves are entitled to a reasonable attor-
neys’ fee from the fund as a whole.16 The common fund doctrine plays a
crucial role “in vindicating the rights of individuals who otherwise might
not consider it worth [their while] to embark on litigation in which the
optimum result might be more than consumed by the cost.”17 Courts have
recognized that the common fund method is particularly appropriate in
cases in which a governmental body has collected an unconstitutional
tax.18
Beginning in the nineteenth century, courts confronted with a petition
for attorneys’ fees in common fund cases have awarded a fee based upon
a reasonable percentage of the common fund.19 Indeed, fee awards based
on a percentage of the common fund are supported by precedent from tax
refund cases dating from at least the Civil War.20 Historically, the enti-
tlement to a percentage of the common fund stems from the court’s equity
power to utilize the doctrines of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.21
Courts have employed a variety of factors to set the reasonable percent-
age, the most common of which have been the risks of the litigation, the
quality of counsel, and the “size of the fund or . . . benefit produced for
the class.”22 The other factors courts sometimes examine include the
novelty and difficulty of the legal issues, the preclusion of other employ-
ment, the customary fee, the quality of counsel and the effort expended,
the undesirability of the case, and the nature and length of the profes-
sional relationship with the client.23
In the 1970s, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the percentage method did not produce rational
and consistent results in “fee-shifting” litigation.24 In that litigation, a
statute required the defendant to pay the prevailing party’s attorneys’
                                                                                                         
16. O’Shea, 397 So. 2d at 1196; City of Miami Beach v. Jacobs, 341 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1976); City of Miami v. Florida Retail Fed’n, Inc., 423 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
17. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980).
18. See Florida Retail, 423 So. 2d at 991; Jacobs, 341 So. 2d at 236.
19. HERBERT B. NEWBERG, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 2.02, at 31 (1986); Third Circuit
Task Force Report on Court-Awarded Attorneys’ Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 242 (3d Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter Task Force Report]; see also Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d
268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984)) (stating that
“the percentage basis method is grounded in tradition”).
20. Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 88 Mass. 152, 164-65 (1863); see John P. Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 882
n.120 (1975); see also NEWBERG, supra note 19, § 2.02, at 31; Task Force Report, supra note
19, at 242; Graulty, 886 F.2d at 272.
21. Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citing Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Internal Imp. Fund Trus-
tees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881)).
22. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 242.
23. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 772 n.3; Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5.
24. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 169 (3d Cir. 1976).
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fees.25 Since the defendant, and not the common fund, was responsible for
paying the prevailing party’s reasonable attorneys’ fee, the percentage
method was unworkable. Thus, the Third Circuit adopted what it termed a
“lodestar” method for fee-shifting cases.26 Under the lodestar method, a
trial court faced with an attorneys’ fee request must first scrutinize the
attorneys’ time records to determine the reasonableness of the hours spent
on each aspect of the litigation.27 The court then must multiply that num-
ber by what it finds to be a reasonable rate of hourly compensation for
each attorney involved.28 It may then adjust the resulting figure to reflect
the contingent nature of the litigation and the quality of the attorneys’
work.29
Following the Third Circuit’s decision, some courts began indiscrimi-
nately applying the lodestar method to both common fund and fee-shifting
cases “without any real analysis of the propriety of doing so”30 and even
though “[t]he public policy considerations . . . are not obviously identi-
cal.”31 However, there are fundamental differences between fee-shifting
cases and common fund cases that warrant different methods for deter-
mining attorneys’ fees. For instance, an award from the common fund
generated by attorneys for a class “rests on the perception that persons
who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost[s] are
unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.”32 Because fees in
common fund cases are awarded from the predetermined damage recovery
rather than from the losing party, such fees are “neither intrinsically pu-
nitive nor designed to further any [particular] statutory public policy.”33
Conversely, statutory fees are intended to further a legislative purpose
by punishing the nonprevailing party and encouraging private parties to
enforce substantive statutory rights where such claims often produce only
nominal damages or declarations of rights.34 Indeed, application of the
lodestar method in fee-shifting cases is often necessary because of the lack
of any “fund” from which to base an award of attorneys’ fees.35 As one
commentator has noted:
                                                                                                         
25. Id. at 162.
26. Id. at 168.
27. Id. at 168-69.
28. Id. at 167.
29. Id. at 168.
30. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 251.
31. Id. (quoting In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 583 n.19 (3d Cir.
1984)).
32. Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
33. Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 822 (1988).
34. NEWBERG, supra note 19, § 2.06, at 39-43; City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
561 (1986).
35. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 247.
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A major distinction between the nature of statutory and common fund
fee awards, however, significantly affects how these contingency risks
are reflected in the calculation of a reasonable fee award. Fee awards
authorized by statute are payable by a losing defendant whether or not
there has been any monetary recovery for the named plaintiffs or for a
class, in contrast to common fund fee awards that are payable out of
the fund recovered. Because statutory fees are payable to prevailing
parties to encourage private enforcement of statutes and deter viola-
tions, and because the results obtained are often nonmonetary or mod-
est recoveries, a formula for a reasonable statutory fee award based on
a percentage of the recovery is not usually available to the courts.36
Because of the different policies involved in common fund and fee-
shifting cases and the difficulties courts encountered in applying the cum-
bersome and subjective methodology required by the lodestar, the initial
attraction of the lodestar method quickly gave way to condemnation. With
its unyielding focus on hours billed, the application of the lodestar in
common fund cases came under intense and almost universal criticism
from courts and commentators alike.37
In light of these attacks, the Third Circuit, the court that gave birth to
the lodestar method, formed a task force (Task Force), headed by Professor
Arthur Miller and comprised of judges and attorneys, to study court-
awarded attorneys’ fees.38  The Task Force strongly recommended the
wholesale return to the percentage method in common fund cases.39
More specifically, the Task Force found the lodestar method to be a
“cumbersome, enervating, and often surrealistic process of preparing and
evaluating fee petitions that now plagues the Bench and Bar.”40 Echoing the
criticisms from courts and commentators, the Task Force identified count-
less problems inherent in applying the lodestar method in common fund
cases:
• it greatly increases the workload on an already overtaxed legal
system;
                                                                                                         
36. NEWBERG, supra note 19, § 1.10, at 17 (citations omitted).
37. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1306
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that the lodestar method “tends to increase enormously the cost of
the litigation to the defense in fees and to the court in hours it must spend on supervision”);
Feuerstein v. Burns, 569 F. Supp. 268, 272 (S.D. Cal. 1983) (finding that lodestar method “is
criticized for overemphasizing the number of hours expended, and thus allowing counsel to ar-
tificially inflate attorneys’ fees requests”); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366,
375 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same); Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(same); George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The “Salvage” Factor in Counsel Fee
Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of the Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 724-25 (1986).
38. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 237.
39. Id. at 242.
40. Id. at 258.
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• its elements are insufficiently objective and produce results that
are not homogeneous;
• it spawns confusion and a lack of predictability in its application;
• it creates a great disincentive for the early settlement of cases and
encourages the accumulation of excessive hours by the most ex-
pensive attorneys, often at the expense of the interests of the
plaintiff class;
• it fails to discourage abuses and delays in the fee-setting process;
• it does not take into account the economic realities of the practice
of law;
• it “creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted
in terms of the realities of the practice of law”; and
• it “is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate
fees in terms of percentages of the settlement fund.”41
Noting the “widespread belief that the deficiencies of the [lodestar
method] either offset or exceed its benefits,”42 the Task Force concluded
that, while the lodestar method continued to have some merit in statutory
fee-shifting cases, fee awards in common fund cases should be based on a
percentage of the fund.43 In the Task Force’s view, the lodestar was ap-
propriate in the fee-shifting context because of the different policies at
stake in that context, and because there often is no resulting common fund
enabling a percentage method.44 The Task Force concluded with the rec-
ommendation that, in common fund cases, courts should attempt to insti-
tute a percentage fee method so as to avoid the inherent deficiencies with
the lodestar process.45
The Task Force’s recommendation for the adoption of the percentage
method in common fund cases was grounded in its recognition of the tan-
gible advantages such a method offers. For instance, awarding a percent-
age of the common fund places less of a burden on the attorneys and the
courts in determining a reasonable fee award, and it is also less subjective
because the court does not have to second-guess attorneys regarding the
reasonableness of a particular task or hours expended on it.46 It also re-
lieves the already overburdened judiciary of the daunting task of scrutiniz-
ing necessarily voluminous attorney time records for the life of the litiga-
                                                                                                         
41. Id. at 246-49; see also Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768,
774 (11th Cir. 1991); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
42. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 246.
43. Id. at 245-46.
44. See Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 822 (1988) (discussing the different dynamics in statutory fee cases and common
fund cases and agreeing with the Task Force that applying variant fee recovery methods to
these two categories of actions will best achieve the differing policy objectives each was de-
signed to further).
45. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 246-49, 256.
46. Id. at 242.
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tion, a review that often delays the disposition of funds to the plaintiff
class.47
Also, because of its ease of administration, the percentage method is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that “[a]
request for attorney[s’] fees should not result in a second major litiga-
tion.”48 As one court recognized, if the lodestar method were used in
common fund cases, the Supreme Court’s plea would be “an unattainable
dream.”49
The percentage method also “remov[es] the inducement to unnecessar-
ily increase hours, prompt[s] early settlement, reduc[es] burdensome pa-
perwork for counsel and the court and provid[es] a degree of predictabil-
ity to fee awards.”50 Finally, the sharper focus on the common fund man-
dated by a percentage method, as opposed to a focus on hours billed, is
appropriate because a common “fund is itself a limiting factor on reason-
able fees” and is the measure of success.51
In light of the rampant criticisms of the lodestar method and the advan-
tages of basing a fee award on a percentage of the common fund, the
United States Supreme Court has followed the Task Force’s recommen-
dations and has rejected the application of the lodestar method in common
fund cases. In Blum v. Stevenson,52 the Court noted that attorneys’ fees in
common fund cases, unlike statutory fee-shifting cases, are “based on a
percentage of the fund bestowed on the class.”53 The Court’s recognition
that the percentage method is necessary in common fund cases is consis-
tent with the Court’s use of such a method in every case in which it has
addressed the computation of a common fund fee award.54 Thus, the
Court, which has favorably cited the Task Force Report,55 has never en-
dorsed the use of any other method in common fund cases.56
Following the Task Force Report and Blum, the Eleventh Circuit man-
dated the percentage method in all common fund cases.57 In Camden I
Condominium Ass’n v. Dunkle, the Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected
the lodestar methodology as unworkable and unprincipled and found that
                                                                                                         
47. See Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir.
1991);  Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
48. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
49. Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986).
50. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
51. HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14.03 (3d ed. 1992).
52. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
53. Id. at 900 n.16.
54. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939); Central R.R. & Banking
Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128 (1885); Internal Imp. Fund Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527, 532 (1881).
55. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 736-37 n.28 (1986).
56. See Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 773 (11th Cir.
1991); see supra note 54.
57. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 768.
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“[a]fter reviewing Blum, the Task Force Report, and the foregoing cases from
other circuits, we believe that the percentage of the fund method is the better
reasoned in a common fund case.”58 The Eleventh Circuit held that the lode-
star method “shall continue to be the applicable method used for determining
statutory fee-shifting awards.”59
Numerous courts, including the influential United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, have followed the Eleventh Circuit’s lead
and have required the application of the percentage method in all common
fund cases.60 Just as in these jurisdictions, the only method previously ac-
cepted in Florida for the determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees in com-
mon fund cases was the percentage method.61 For example, in Tenney v. City
of Miami Beach,62 a class of taxpayers successfully sued a municipality for a
refund of improperly collected taxes. The trial court applied a percentage of
recovery method and awarded the attorneys thirty-three percent of the com-
mon fund.63 In affirming the award from the common fund, the Florida Su-
preme Court found the contractually agreed upon percentage to be reasonable
in light of “the amount of the claims, the difficulties encountered, the expense
attorneys are forced to incur, and the fact that the litigation ran over a period
of four years.”64 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the thirty-three
percent award was fully justified by the risk undertaken by counsel:
The liens had to be shown to be illegal. Counsel took a chance on showing
this. If they had failed they would have been out their labor and expenses
for nothing. They have been out of any compensation for four years, must
bear the expense of the litigation and when they get this paid including
other charges in the way of income taxes, office expense, etc., the fee will
be a modest one for the service rendered.65
The Florida district courts of appeal consistently followed Tenney in
awarding attorneys’ fees from the common fund on a percentage basis.66
                                                                                                         
58. Ressler v. Jacobson, 149 F.R.D. 651, 653 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (“In class action suits,
where a fund is recovered and fees are awarded by the court from the fund,” Camden I and
Blum require the court to “comput[e] fees as a percentage of the common fund recovered.”).
59. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774.
60. See Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also
Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]his court [has] distinguished common fund cases from statutory fee cases and recognized
the propriety of awarding attorneys’ fees in the former on a percentage of the fund, rather than
lodestar basis.”); Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.
1989).
61. See, e.g., Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 11 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1942).
62. Id. at 188.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 190.
65. Id.
66. City of Miami Beach v. Jacobs, 341 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); City of Miami
v. Florida Retail Fed’n, Inc., 423 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Shlachtman v. Mitrani, 508
So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1987).
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For instance, in City of Miami Beach v. Jacobs,67 an attorney successfully
represented a class of individuals seeking a refund of certain “fire line
charges.”68 The circuit court applied the percentage method and awarded
the attorney thirty-seven percent of the common fund in attorneys’ fees.69
The court of appeals affirmed, and ordered that the attorney receive as a
reasonable fee thirty-three percent of the fund.70
Similarly, in City of Miami v. Florida Retail Federation, Inc.,71 a
group of merchants filed a class action seeking to recover the excess
payments of occupational license taxes. The trial court ruled in favor of
the merchants, ordered a refund of the tax payments, and awarded attor-
neys’ fees in “a sum equal to one-third of the gross amount of reim-
bursement for 1980-82.”72 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed
the attorneys’ fee award as reasonable, based on the benefit class mem-
bers received from the attorneys’ efforts.73
In light of Tenney and its progeny as well as the universal criticism
surrounding the application of the lodestar method in common fund cases,
the Florida Supreme Court had never, before the instant case, approved
the application of any method other than the percentage method in class
action common fund litigation. Indeed, Florida courts had confined the
application of the lodestar method to the context in which it belongs—
statutory fee-shifting cases—and had awarded attorneys’ fees under the
percentage method in common fund cases.74
For instance, in Shlachtman v. Mitrani,75 the plaintiff in a successful con-
tract action for specific performance moved for an award of attorneys’ fees
under the parties’ contract. The trial court found the plaintiff’s fee request un-
reasonable and awarded half of the requested fees and costs.76 On appeal, the
plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in failing to apply the lodestar
method.77 Agreeing with the defendant’s assertion that the lodestar pertained
only to statutory fees, the court of appeals found that “until such time as the
supreme court makes it clear that the ‘lodestar’ method is to be used in any
fee awards, its application should be so limited.”78
                                                                                                         
67. 341 So. 2d at 236.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 423 So. 2d at 991.
72. Id. at 992.
73. Id. at 993.
74. See, e.g., Bailey, Hunt, Jones & Busto, P.A. v. Roland Langen, P.A., 632 So. 2d 82
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (affirming attorneys’ contractual fee award of 25% of the common fund
in a class action settlement).
75. 508 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 495; see 1 JAMES C. HAUSER, ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN FLORIDA 31 (1995).
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III.   THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
It was against this legal backdrop that the Florida Supreme Court con-
sidered the trial court’s award of ten percent of the common fund as a
reasonable attorneys’ fee for the Impact Fee lawyers. The Florida Su-
preme Court first observed that the paramount goal in fee setting was de-
termination of an “objective and consistent” fee award because, in its
view, an inconsistent and subjective fee award “undermines the confi-
dence of the public in the bench and bar” and “brings the court into dis-
repute and destroys its power to perform adequately the function of its
creation.”79 It then rejected the percentage method in common fund cases
in favor of the lodestar method, which it believed “provide[s] a more
consistent and objective structure for determining reasonable fees in
common-fund as well as fee-shifting cases.”80
In the court’s view, “objectivity and consistency” in fee setting are
best achieved by focusing on the hours billed and the reasonable rates for
those hours because such a framework yields a proper underpinning for
an objective structure in fee setting.81 The court stated that
“reasonableness is directly related to how the market values legal services
for which clients negotiate rates” and found that the lodestar provides an
“evidentiary basis” for evaluating such a reasonable fee.82
Rejecting the percentage method, the court found that “to begin the as-
sessment by arbitrarily picking a percentage amount without any reliance
on a cognizable structure invites decisions that are nonobjective and in-
consistent.”83 The percentage method defies objectivity and consistency
because “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable percentage may differ from one
judge to another depending on each judge’s predilections, background,
and geographical location in the state.”84
Additionally, the court rejected the contention that in common fund
cases, the lodestar method overemphasizes the time expended by counsel
and places too little consideration on the contingency risk and the results
acquired for the class.85 The court determined that factors such as risks
and results are better considered by accepting or adjusting the base lode-
star calculation and by allowing multipliers.86 In the court’s view, multipli-
ers sufficiently enhance the fee award for the risks taken and results ob-
                                                                                                         
79. Kuhnlein v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 662 So. 2d 309, 313 (Fla. 1995) (quoting
Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831, 833 (1935)).
80. Id. at 312.
81. Id. at 313 (quoting Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145,
1149-50 (Fla. 1985)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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tained and, if capped, “ensure that the enhancement is not so substantial
that the fees become excessive and thereby unreasonable.”87
More specifically, the court held that under certain circumstances, a
multiplier was appropriate in common fund cases. Although the maximum
multiplier allowed under Florida law in fee-shifting cases was 2.5,88 the
court set the maximum multiplier in common fund cases at five in order
“to place greater emphasis on the monetary results achieved.”89 In the
court’s view, such a multiplier was “sufficient to alleviate the contingency
risk factor involved and attract high level counsel to common fund cases
while producing a fee which remains within the bounds of reasonable-
ness.”90 Thus, reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court in sup-
port of the fee petition, the court found that the hours expended and the
rates charged for those hours were reasonable.91 Without any additional
analysis, the court concluded that in light of the attorneys’ remarkable and
unprecedented success, “class counsel in this case is entitled to the maxi-
mum multiplier available,” thus yielding a fee of approximately $6.5 mil-
lion.92
Justice Kogan, joined by Justice Shaw, dissented in part from the
court’s decision.93 In their view, the district court should retain the dis-
cretion to base the choice between the percentage and lodestar method-
ologies upon the circumstances of the particular case.94 Justice Harding is-
sued a partial dissent in a separate opinion, in which he, too, stated that
the percentage method “should remain available to Florida courts con-
fronted with the task of setting reasonable attorneys’ fees in common fund
cases.”95 In his view, the appropriate fee in a case such as the Impact Fee
litigation would be six percent of the common fund.96
IV.   A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM
The Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the lodestar method in com-
mon fund class actions constitutes a sea change not only in the law of at-
torneys’ fees, but also in the law of class action litigation. The court’s
decision may well encourage strike suits while effectively closing the
courthouse doors to many Florida citizens by deterring qualified counsel from
undertaking important contingent fee cases, such as the Impact Fee litigation.
                                                                                                         
87. Id. at 314-15.
88. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla. 1990).
89. Kuhnlein, 662 So. 2d at 315.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 316 (Kogan, J. and Shaw, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 317-19 (Kogan, J. and Shaw, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 320 (Harding, J., dissenting separately).
96. Id. at 322 (Harding, J., dissenting separately).
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The decision may also reward the inefficient and punish the productive
and result in the needless waste of scarce judicial resources.
The primary flaw in the court’s decision can be attributed to the
court’s adoption of an erroneous factual and legal premise. In the court’s
view, the overriding goal in fee setting is the need to ensure the respect of
the citizenry for government and the judicial system, which the court be-
lieved could be achieved only through an “objective and consistent”
methodology—a methodology rooted in the number of hours expended.97
However, the court’s emphasis on ensuring that the citizenry respect the
government and the judicial system reflects an ill-conceived response to
public opinion and makes for poor law and policy.
A.   Public Policy Favors a Fee System That Is Not Based on the Hours
Expended
The court’s assertion that objectivity and consistency are best served
by focusing on the hours expended is highly suspect, given that all three
branches of Florida government have previously approved of percentage
fees in contingent litigation. Indeed, the judicial branch has approved
model contracts (which were used in the Vehicle Impact Fee case) that
allow for contingent fees of up to forty percent of the recovery.98 The
Legislature has similarly enacted at least two statutes that contemplate
percentage fees in contingent cases equal to, or in excess of, twenty-five
percent.99 In executing its agreement with thirteen separate law firms to
represent the State in the recent Medicaid/tobacco litigation, the Execu-
tive Branch has placed its imprimatur on such agreements.100 If the citi-
zenry’s respect for government and the judicial system is served by con-
tingent fees in these contexts, it is difficult to understand why the same
should not hold true in class action litigation. Indeed, a majority of other
jurisdictions,101 and Florida courts102 before Kuhnlein III, apparently man-
aged to maintain the respect of the citizenry for the government and the
judicial system despite their approval of percentage fees in class action
cases.
                                                                                                         
97. Id. at 313.
98. Florida Bar re Amendment to Code of Professional Responsibility (Contingent Fees),
494 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1986); Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i) (stating that any fee exceeding
the following standards shall be excessive: 1) 40% of any recovery up to one million dollars
and 2) 30% of any portion between one and two million dollars).
99. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(15)(b) (1995) (attorneys’ fees in Medicaid/tobacco litiga-
tion capped at 30% of common fund); id. § 768.28(8) (permitting negligence statutes fees as
high as 25%).
100. Id. § 409.910(14)(b) (attorneys’ fees in Medicaid/tobacco litigation capped at 30% of
the common fund).
101. See supra note 58.
102. Tenney  v. City of Miami Beach, 11 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1942); City of Miami Beach v.
Jacobs, 341 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1977), and
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977).
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As a policy matter, the decision to apply the percentage of recovery
method to all common fund cases, including taxpayer class actions, makes
tremendous sense. In this country, we generally compensate individuals
for the results obtained, not for the number of hours expended and re-
sources devoured. As one court noted, while applying a percentage
method in a similar case:
Where success is a condition precedent to compensation, “hours of
time expended” is a nebulous, highly variable standard, of limited sig-
nificance. One thousand plodding hours may be far less productive than
one imaginative, brilliant hour. A surgeon who skillfully performs an
appendectomy in seven minutes is entitled to no smaller fee than one
who takes an hour; many a patient would think he is entitled to
more.103
In fact, a major incentive for competent counsel to accept class action
representation, where the prospect of success is highly uncertain and the
potential for significant work is high, is the possibility of a large fee as
the resulting benefit to a substantial number of persons. This is a normal
and necessary component to any risky investment in the free enterprise
system; it has always been encouraged, not discouraged, by public policy.
There are numerous instances in which compensation considerably be-
yond that justified solely by the time investment is realized because of the
large number of persons willing to pay relatively small amounts of com-
pensation in return. Many examples can be found, for instance, in the
entertainment and sports industry. Legal services are of no less signifi-
cance than athletic and entertainment performances; lawyers who achieve
virtuoso performances and provide value to thousands of class members
should be compensated no differently.
More specifically, the court’s decision is based essentially on the mis-
taken factual premise that an hourly based system reflects the customary
market rate for legal services in contingent class action litigation. It fails
to recognize that class action litigation is a form of contingent litigation
with no recovery without victory; it is no different from a personal injury
suit in which attorneys routinely demand, and receive, a one-third per-
centage of the recovery in exchange for the risks they assume in such liti-
gation. It is precisely because class action litigation is contingent fee work
that the courts have found the percentage method most closely approximates
the manner in which attorneys are compensated in the marketplace.104 Contin-
                                                                                                         
103. In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 610, 631 (D. Colo. 1976)
(quoting Hornstein, supra note 37, at 660).
104. The percentage method thus more accurately reflects the economics of litigation prac-
tice which, “given the uncertainties and hazards of litigation, must necessarily be result-
oriented.” Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Howes v. Atkins, 668 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Ky. 1987)); see also In re Continental Ill. Sec.
Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that percentage approach most closely approxi-
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gent recovery cases simply are not undertaken under any form of hourly
basis, both because the client cannot afford to pay such a rate and also be-
cause the attorney demands a greater reward for the risks that are being
taken.
B.   Abusive Strike Suits May Receive a Boost Under the Majority’s
Opinion
The court’s assertion that the lodestar method will ensure objectivity
and consistency is premised on the belief that the lodestar will produce
smaller fee awards than the percentage method. Although this was true in
the Impact Fee litigation, in many cases the award will be larger, not
smaller. Indeed, there are a large number of class action lawsuits that, un-
fortunately, fall into the category of “strike suits.” These strike suits are
brought against “deep-pocket” defendants in the hope of forcing a settle-
ment through threat of publicity, liability (however remote), and signifi-
cant consumption of time for the companies’ senior executives. Most of
such suits are brought and settled with the putative class members receiv-
ing little in settlement, but with the class action lawyers achieving sub-
stantial attorneys’ fees because they purportedly have spent thousands of
hours advancing their dubious claims. It is for this very reason that many
corporations (which are typically the defendants) have lobbied extensively
in Congress for litigation reform and the reason for which they are press-
ing for percentage recoveries in class actions.105 The percentage recovery
is viewed as a method to stymie strike suits because attorneys will be
compensated only for achieving results, not for billing hours.
Furthermore, the percentage method removes any incentive to increase
hours unnecessarily and is far less burdensome on the parties and the
court. As one commentator noted:
If one wishes to economize on the judicial time that is today invested in
monitoring class and derivative litigation, the highest priority should be
                                                                                                         
mates the manner in which attorneys are compensated in the marketplace for these types of
cases); Steiner v. Hercules, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 771, 792 (D. Del. 1993) (stating that
“percentage method is widely used in the legal marketplace in contingent fee agreements and
better reflects what a client, at the outset of the litigation, is willing to pay”).
105. See 27 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 116-117 (Jan 20, 1995) (noting that Representative Edward
Markey (Dem. Mass.) introduced the Securities Reform Bill (HB 555) that would mandate that
fees be calculated on the percentage of funds recovered, rather than on how many billable
hours the lawyers generated, “[to] assure that the interests of the plaintiffs’ attorneys are more
closely aligned with the interests of their clients.”). Similarly, the “Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act” (SB 240) sponsored by Senators Peter Domenici (Repub. N.M.) and Chris-
topher Dodd (Dem. Conn.) also contains a provision requiring that the courts tie an award of
attorneys’ fees directly to the amount recovered by investors. Id. The final bill, styled “Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,” as approved by the Committee of Conference,
provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees based upon a “reasonable percentage” of the
amount recovered for the class. See HR Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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given to those reforms that restrict collusion and are essentially self-
policing. The percentage of the recovery fee award formula is such a
“deregulatory” reform because it relies on incentives rather than costly
monitoring. Ultimately, this “deregulatory” approach is the only alter-
native to converting the courts into the equivalent of public utility
commissions that oversee the plaintiff’s attorney and elaborately fix the
attorney’s “fair” return.106
In contrast, under the lodestar method, attorneys litigating such cases
will need to log sufficient hours to make the case profitable. The court’s
decision creates a great disincentive for the expeditious resolution of
cases, as any attorney facing the limited recovery imposed by the lodestar
is encouraged to run up hours in order to make the case economically
feasible. Courts have criticized the lodestar method “for overemphasizing
the number of hours expended, and thus allowing counsel to artificially
inflate attorneys’ fees requests.”107 The end result is a drain on the state’s
judicial system and the defendants that bear the brunt of ill-conceived dis-
covery motions, trials, and appeals.
C.   Conversely, Individuals Seeking To Challenge State Actions May Find
the Courthouse Door Closed
With attorneys given the economic motive to “run the meter” for years
against those defendants likely to settle at the end of the game (i.e., major
corporate defendants), many individuals with claims to press against the
government and other, more recalcitrant defendants will face significant
hurdles to obtaining representation. Indeed, the majority’s opinion may
have largely closed the courthouse doors to many class actions against the
State because an attorney considering such an action must enter into the
lawsuit knowing that 1) the state has unlimited resources and will litigate
the action for years; 2) if the case challenges a state statute, the Attorney
General usually cannot settle the case, and the only way of prevailing is to
take the case to judgment and through appeals; and 3) the attorney has no
idea whether or how much he or she will be compensated for the risk
even if the attorney prevails.108
Indeed, the court’s decision in the Impact Fee litigation provides little
guidance to a trial court in setting fee awards and deciding what the mul-
tiplier should be. Under the court’s lodestar methodology, a trial court
                                                                                                         
106. Coffee, supra note 37, at 724-25.
107. See Feuerstein v. Burns, 569 F. Supp. 268, 272 (S.D. Cal. 1983).
108. The Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the lodestar in common fund cases turns
class actions seeking a refund of taxes into a disfavored subset of class action suits. Since the
federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C § 7421(a) (1988), bars the filing of suits in federal
courts to challenge the constitutionality of state taxes where the state provides a plain and
speedy remedy, attorneys representing putative class representatives in taxpayer refund actions
will be condemned to state court and to a lodestar recovery.
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could award a fee that is many times that awarded by another court in a
similar situation. In contrast, under the percentage method, it is unlikely
that awards will vary by such a magnitude. Although the particular per-
centage awarded will vary depending upon the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion, the results achieved and the risks taken are fairly objective
standards which should (and, indeed, have) brought about consistent re-
sults.
The court’s assertion that the possibility of a multiplier is sufficient to
ensure competent counsel in common fund class action cases, such as the
Impact Fee litigation, is dubious at best. The court’s decision does not
guarantee a fee in any way commensurate with the risks. Unlike attorneys
undertaking contingent representation in other cases (for example, per-
sonal injury attorneys), class counsel will no longer be able to evaluate
the time and risks involved and reach an agreement with the class repre-
sentatives as to the appropriate percentage recovery for undertaking that
risk. Instead, an attorney undertaking a class action case must include in
his or her calculus the real possibility that, even if successful in litigating
the case to judgment, the attorney will be subject to a “lodestar” inquiry
into the appropriateness of the hours and the multiplier to be employed.
Depending upon the time required and risks involved, a multiplier of two
or three may not warrant undertaking many cases—including the Vehicle
Impact Fee litigation. In light of the time and financial commitment that
complex litigation demands, it is unlikely that counsel will be willing to
take cases unless the prospects of prevailing are great or the likelihood of
obtaining the highest available multiplier is real.
Under these circumstances, the willingness of counsel to embark on
broad class representation will likely be diminished—especially in tax-
payer class actions which are complex, hotly contested, and involve a
high risk of nonpayment for very substantial hours and costs expended.
Yet, this is precisely the type of lawyering the common fund fee award is
designed to promote. As the court noted in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc.,109 an attorney “should not be penalized for undertaking a
case which may ‘make new law.’ Instead, he should be appropriately
compensated for accepting the challenge.”110
Without the prospect of a reasonable fee, individuals who have small
amounts at stake, such as the $295 in the Impact Fee litigation, will not
be able to find counsel to accept the representation; they will find it eco-
nomically unfeasible to pursue such litigation individually.111 As former
                                                                                                         
109. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 718.
111. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (recognizing that litigation
over small individual claims would be prohibitive without class action mechanism); Hawkins
v. Thorp Loan & Thrift Co., No. 85-6074, 1992 WL 589727 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 1992)
(finding nonmonetary benefit of establishing incentives for such cases to be filed in future sup-
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Chief Justice Barkett so poignantly noted, “Without the contingency fee
system, the vast majority of our citizens would be unable even to enter the
arena, much less to fight evenly against those who, knowing their advan-
tage, would (by virtue of human nature alone, never mind malice or bad
motives) not hesitate to press it.”112
The end result of the court’s adoption of the lodestar method could be
that systemic and far-reaching wrongs, such as those perpetrated by the
State of Florida in the Impact Fee litigation, will go unchallenged and
thus result in a society in which the deprivation of fundamental constitu-
tional rights is permitted to continue. Certainly, public respect for the ju-
dicial system is not fostered when the average citizen is denied access to
that system in order to right everyday wrongs and when elected public
officials face no real deterrent to enacting unconstitutional laws.
V.   CONCLUSION
Since the founding of our nation, state legislatures have enacted tax
statutes infringing upon the constitutional rights of their citizens, as well
as those of citizens of other states.  Because the amount at stake for an
individual taxpayer often is too insignificant for the taxpayer to justify an
individual lawsuit, the primary vehicle for challenging unconstitutional
tax statutes has been the class action. Attorneys confronted with the pros-
pect of representing such a class will only undertake such a representation
when the efforts and risks are justified by the possibility of a sizable re-
ward. By virtually negating the possibility for an attorney to recover a
substantial fee award and thus creating a strong disincentive to undertake
such litigation, the Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the hours-based
lodestar method effectively closes the courthouse doors to the citizens of
the state. With fewer lawyers willing to take these cases and, thus, fewer
cases being brought, state legislatures across the country will feel freer to
enact laws that cross the constitutional line. The end result will likely be a
society in which lawyers are deterred from filing suits to right constitu-
tional wrongs and in which legislatures are encouraged to enact such laws
in the first place.
                                                                                                         
ports large fee award); Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 481 F.2d 1045,
1050-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973).
112. Florida Bar re Amendment to Code of Professional Responsibility (Contingent Fees),
494 So. 2d 960, 969 (Fla. 1986) (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
